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P. Rajan Varadarajan, Satish Jayachandran, & J. Chris White

Strategic Interdependence in
Organizations: Deconglomeration
and Marketing Strategy
Although strategy exists at multiple levels in a firm (corporate, business, and functional), there is a dearth of
research in marketing literature that focuses on the dependency among strategy at different levels. The authors
address this issue by examining the relationship between deconglomeration and marketing strategy. Deconglomeration refers to the divestiture behavior of a conglomerate firm and the transformation of its business portfolio from
one that is largely composed of several unrelated businesses to one composed of fewer and related businesses.
Drawing on multiple theoretical perspectives, the authors propose a conceptual model delineating the environmental and organizational drivers of deconglomeration and its outcomes for marketing. The authors suggest that
after deconglomeration, (1) a firm can be expected to be more competitor and customer oriented, (2) multimarket
contact with competing firms and seller concentration will increase, (3) businesses retained by the firm will be more
innovative and place greater emphasis on advertising compared with sales promotion, and (4) the firm’s culture
may become more externally oriented. Furthermore, the locus of decision making for marketing strategy may shift
more toward senior management levels. In summary, changes in a firm’s corporate strategy could lead to significant changes in the marketing strategy of its business units.

n a recent commentary advancing an agenda for increasing marketing knowledge use, Deshpandé (1999) stresses
the need to break free from the shackles of functional
silos in examining business problems and advocates
research that is cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural, crossfunctional, and customer-centric in focus. In addition to the
four Cs proposed by Deshpandé, a fifth C that merits consideration, particularly in the realm of strategy, is research
characterized by a multilevel or cross-level focus. Strategy
exists at multiple levels in an organization—corporate, business, and functional. Corporate strategy specifies the businesses in which a firm chooses to compete. Business strategy specifies how different businesses in the firm’s portfolio
will compete in the marketplace. Marketing strategy refers
to the marketing activities and decisions related to generating and sustaining competitive advantage for the business
(Day, Weitz, and Wensley 1990). Although strategy exists at
multiple levels, the interdependencies among strategy at different levels remains relatively unexplored. Yet, as the
PepsiCo example described next suggests, marketing strategies pursued by businesses often are influenced by changes
in corporate strategy that manifest themselves as changes in
the firm’s portfolio of businesses.
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In 1996, PepsiCo divested its restaurant businesses
(Pizza Hut, KFC, and Taco Bell) to focus on beverages and
snack foods. Following the divestiture, PepsiCo undertook a
major reorganization activity it branded as the “Power of
One.” The Power of One strategy encompasses efforts by
PepsiCo to promote beverages and salty snack products
together. For example, retail stores are encouraged to display these products side by side. Furthermore, in negotiating
for shelf space from supermarkets, PepsiCo promotes the
combined profit potential of its range of products. Although
the idea of promoting beverages and salty snacks together is
not new, after PepsiCo divested the restaurant business, this
strategy received the attention of top management and
became the company’s strategic focus (Hays 1999).
Changes in corporate strategy can derail long-pursued
and often successful marketing strategies while affording
opportunities for new ones. The potential impact of corporate strategy on marketing strategy makes it imperative that
marketing researchers and managers understand the contours of the change and its effect on marketing. The
intended contribution of this article is the focus it brings to
research on the cross-level dependency of marketing strategy and the detailing of a research agenda on such issues.
Specifically, we elucidate the influence of corporate strategy on marketing strategy by examining the drivers of
deconglomeration and its outcomes for marketing. Deconglomeration refers to the divestiture behavior of a conglomerate firm and the transformation of its business portfolio
from one composed of several largely unrelated businesses
to one composed of relatively fewer and interrelated busi-
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nesses.1 It constitutes a corporate-level strategy decision to
retain in the firm’s portfolio only those businesses that, in
the assessment of the top management of the firm, have the
potential to leverage the firm’s core competencies to emerge
as major players in a global marketplace. Deconglomeration
has been termed “a major evolutionary change for the
American corporation” (Markides 1995, p. 8). In recent
years, deconglomeration has been reshaping the landscape
of corporate America by restructuring the business portfolios of conglomerate diversified firms from unrelated diversified to related diversified or focused (see Markides 1995).
Case in point is the Sears Roebuck Company, which has
retreated from a conglomerate strategy characterized in the
business press as a one-stop shop for everything from socks
to stocks. Subsequent to the divestiture of its Allstate insurance, Coldwell Banker real estate, Dean Witter brokerage,
and Discover credit card businesses, Sears is currently
focusing on its retailing business.2
In conglomerate growth through diversification, firms
used the profits generated by their present businesses to
1Central to a firm’s diversification strategy are decisions related
to (1) the direction of diversification (e.g., related versus unrelated/conglomerate diversification), (2) the degree of diversification (e.g., high, moderate, and low levels of related or unrelated
diversification) and (3) the mode of diversification (e.g., internal
development, acquisition, merger, joint venture). As Markides
(1995) notes, a strategy of related diversification in which the various businesses are structured around the firm’s core competencies
is expected to pay off through synergistic economies. In a strategy
of unrelated or conglomerate diversification, although the various
businesses may have no operational synergies, the firm is expected
to benefit through financial economies.
2Although in some cases it is conceivable that a strategy of
deconglomeration (guided by an objective assessment of the firm’s
core competencies) will lead to a firm returning to its roots, it is
also possible to envision deconglomeration leading to a firm
divesting businesses that composed its portfolio before conglomeration. Cases in point are Corning Incorporated and Dial Corporation. Founded in 1851, Corning was well known for more than a
century for shaping glass into household consumer products such
as Pyrex and Corning Ware brand kitchenware. As recently as
1995, it was a conglomerate whose portfolio was composed of five
lines of business: consumer products (13%), health care services
(39%), telecommunications (22%), advanced materials (16%), and
information display (10%). Following the divestiture of its health
care division and consumer products division, the refocused and
restructured Corning is still a maker of glass-based products, but of
a very different kind. The company spins out glass in the form of
more than 30 million kilometers of optical fiber annually, and the
telecommunications division accounts for approximately 70% of
the firm’s annual revenues (Creswell 2000).
Over a period of time, the Greyhound Company, originally an
intercity bus service firm, evolved into a conglomerate by diversifying into several businesses, including household cleanser products (e.g., detergents) and personal care toiletry products (e.g., bath
soaps, deodorants), processed meat foods, and food catering service. The firm that emerged in the aftermath of deconglomeration
is no longer in the intercity bus service business. It is a consumer
products company currently operating under the name Dial Corporation. Dial’s principal lines of business after deconglomeration are
personal care products (Dial, Breck, and Tone brands), laundry
products (Purex, Borateem, and Sta-Flo brands), specialty body
care products (Sarah Michaels and Nature’s Accents brands), air
fresheners (Renuzit brand), and canned meats (Armour brand).
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finance entry into new, often unrelated businesses. Such
diversification was justified by financial synergy considerations. The corporate headquarters, in this case, functioned as
an internal capital market allocating funds on the basis of
the relative market attractiveness of individual businesses
and their relative competitive positions. However, in recent
years, the role of the corporate headquarters seems to have
changed from that of an arbiter of financial capital to one of
a trustee of the firm’s valuable resources, such as its brand,
customer, and channel equity (i.e., market-based assets; see
Srivastava, Sherwani, and Fahey 1998); human resources
portfolio; and competencies portfolio. This change has been
associated with the reorganization of businesses around a
firm’s core competencies and the divestiture of businesses
that cannot leverage these competencies. A significant portion of the resources freed up by these divestitures tends to
be redeployed toward enhancing the competitive position of
the businesses retained through pursuit of market penetration (e.g., acquiring direct competitors, increasing market
share), market development (e.g., entering new geographic
markets), and product development (e.g., introducing new
products in the markets presently served) strategies.
In essence, unlike the era of conglomeration that was
guided by a corporate philosophy of growing by diversifying, the era of deconglomeration is being shaped by a corporate philosophy of growing by divesting. Although growing by divesting may sound like an oxymoron, it can be a
viable road to enhancing the long-term performance of conglomerate firms through judicious business deletion and
resource reallocation decisions. In summary, the guiding
philosophy here is one of pursuing growth by focusing on
the firm’s core competencies instead of the previous philosophy of focusing on financial synergies. Consequently, we
argue that the marketing behavior of the businesses constituting the firm’s portfolio is likely to change. In an attempt
to provide theoretical and practical insights into this issue to
marketing academicians and managers, in the sections that
follow we
∑Propose a conceptual model delineating the antecedents and
marketing-related outcomes of deconglomeration,
∑Present research propositions that explicate the relationships
delineated in the proposed model, and
∑Propose an agenda for further research in this area.

Drivers and Outcomes of
Deconglomeration
A conceptual model delineating the relationship between
deconglomeration intensity and its drivers and outcomes is
presented in Figure 1. Here, the focal construct, deconglomeration intensity, is modeled as a function of five sets of drivers: (1) macroenvironmental drivers, (2) corporate governance drivers, (3) behavior of referent firms, (4) market
power, and (5) strategic variety. Deconglomeration intensity
is conceptualized as the extent to which a conglomerate firm
has divested businesses from its portfolio over a defined
period—that is, the proportion of a firm’s sales at time t
accounted for by businesses divested during the period t to

FIGURE 1
Drivers and Outcomes of Deconglomeration Intensity: A Conceptual Model
Drivers

Outcomes

Macroenvironmental Drivers
•Openness of international markets (P1)
•Intensity of antitrust policy deterrents to
intraindustry mergers (P2a)
•Intensity of antitrust policy deterrents to related
diversification (P2b)
•Perceived legitimacy of conglomerate form (P3)
Corporate Governance Drivers
•State of development of the market for corporate
control (P4)
•Compensation of top management: proportion in the
form of stock options and bonuses (P5)
•Level of institutional activism (P6)

Effect on Competitive Behavior
•Level of competitor orientation (P10)
•Extent of multimarket contact (P11)
•Extent of seller concentration (P12)
Effect on Customer Orientation
•Level of customer orientation (P13)
Effect on New Product Introduction
•New product intensity (P14)
Deconglomeration
Intensity

Behavior of Referent Firms
•Deconglomeration intensity of referent firms (P7)
Market Power
•Industry-specific market power of businesses in the
firm’s portfolio (P8)
Strategic Variety
•Strategic variety of portfolio (P9)

t + x.3 As regards the outcomes of deconglomeration, our
focus here is limited to those that are germane to marketing.
Principal among these are (1) competitive behavior, (2) customer orientation, (3) new product introduction, (4) brand
advertising, (5) corporate culture, and (6) locus of decision
making for marketing strategy. We discuss the model in
detail in the next two sections.

Effect on Brand Advertising
•Advertising intensity (P15)
Effect on Corporate Culture
•Likelihood of corporate culture evolving to an
adhocracy or market culture (P16)
Effect on Locus of Decision Making for
Marketing Strategy
•Extent of top management involvement in
marketing strategy decision making (P17)

In recent years, several macroenvironmental factors, including increasing international market openness, changes in
antitrust policies, and a decline in the perceived legitimacy
of conglomerate structure, have influenced the divestiture
behavior of conglomerate firms.

International market openness. Before the 1990s, many
international markets were characterized by high barriers to
entry, often forcing firms to pursue growth by diversifying
into new businesses within their home countries. Over the
past decade, however, international markets have become
considerably more open. In the more liberal international
investment environment, firms now have a real choice
between international market diversification (extending the
geographic scope of their present businesses) and intranational business diversification (entering into new businesses
in their presently served markets).
The theory of the multinational firm suggests that firms
choose to become multinationals because, other conditions
remaining the same, a firm that pursues international market
diversification can be expected to outperform a firm that
pursues intranational business diversification for the following reasons:

3We wish to point out certain limitations in the conceptualization
of deconglomeration intensity. Nuances such as harvesting and liquidation and partial divestment are not isolated by this conceptualization (see Hopkins 1991). Furthermore, it is conceivable that a
conglomerate in dire financial straits might resort to divesting one
or more of its core businesses rather than engaging in a deliberate
strategy of deconglomeration and divestiture of noncore businesses. In such cases, the proposed conceptualization would capture divestment intensity (see Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel
1994) rather than deconglomeration intensity. Despite these limitations, to the extent that such behavior is rare, the proposed conceptualization is likely to provide a fairly robust measure of deconglomeration intensity.

∑Multinational corporations (MNCs), compared with firms
pursuing intranational business diversification, have greater
ability to exploit three sources of competitive advantage: differences in factor costs, scale economies, and scope. These
sources of competitive advantage are open to all firms, but
international market diversification provides MNCs with
opportunities that are greater in degrees (Ghoshal 1987).
∑The exposure of MNCs to highly diverse markets provides
them with broader learning opportunities in comparison with
purely domestic firms. This may enable MNCs to outperform
their purely domestic rivals (Ghoshal 1987).
∑Although extracting additional rents from the stock of skills
and resources currently possessed by the firm is the impetus

Drivers of Deconglomeration
Macroenvironmental Drivers
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for entering new international markets, diversification into
new businesses would entail either the acquisition or the
internal development of new skills and resources. All else
being equal, the latter approach is associated with greater outcome uncertainty.

Deconglomeration could therefore be a consequence of
the opening up of many international markets—that is, an
action by conglomerates to free up resources to pursue
growth through more profitable international market diversification in core businesses in place of less profitable intranational business diversification.
P1: The greater the openness of international markets, the
greater is the deconglomeration intensity.

Antitrust policies. The antitrust policies of the 1960s and
1970s were dominated by a focus on preventing the emergence of concentrated market structures, presumably
because of the strong influence of the structure–conduct–
performance (SCP) model in industrial organization economics. The SCP model (Bain 1956) views industry structure as the determinant of firm behavior and performance. A
concentrated market structure, according to this model,
facilitates oligopolistic coordination among firms, resulting
in lower output, higher prices, and higher rates of return. To
prevent the emergence of concentrated market structures,
antitrust policy strongly discouraged intraindustry mergers
and, to a degree, diversification into closely related businesses through mergers and acquisitions. Consequently,
firms resorted to unrelated diversification in their quests for
growth, which led to the emergence of conglomerates
(Lichtenberg 1990).
Antitrust policy, however, changed radically in the 1980s.
The Reagan administration’s faith in the power of a free-market economy to promote higher economic performance led to
less stringent enforcement of antitrust statutes and changes in
antitrust policy (Schleifer and Vishny 1991). This reduced the
institutional constraints placed on firms from growing in their
present and/or related lines of businesses. These changes could
have been influenced by the efficiency model of industrial
organization economics (Demsetz 1973), which suggests that
the relationship between concentration and profitability is due
to efficiency differences between firms rather than the result of
collusion and coordination as is postulated in the SCP model.
Less stringent enforcement of and changes in antitrust statutes
were conducive to intraindustry mergers, hostile takeovers,
and leveraged buyouts. Consequently, there seems to have
been a sharp increase in intraindustry mergers during the 1980s
(see Schleifer and Vishny 1991). Therefore, it is conceivable
that deconglomeration is a consequence of (1) the opportunities that became available to conglomerates to pursue growth
in their core businesses through actions such as intraindustry
acquisitions and diversification into related businesses and (2)
the need to generate resources for such growth. Therefore,
P2: The lower the intensity of antitrust policy deterrents to (a)
intraindustry mergers and acquisitions and (b) diversification into related businesses, the greater is the deconglomeration intensity.
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Legitimacy of the conglomerate organizational form.
According to population (or organizational) ecology theory,
firms exist primarily because of stakeholders’ demands for
reliability and accountability (Hannan and Freeman 1984).
Reliability, to the shareholders of a firm, is the firm’s ability
to provide superior returns consistently, compared with the
returns that shareholders can realize by pursuing alternative
investment opportunities. Accountability refers to the ability
of a firm to explain to its shareholders that resources have
been used appropriately and that managerial actions taken
are in the best interests of shareholders. Reliability and
accountability provide an organizational form with legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders. Organizations must
maintain reliability and accountability over long periods of
time. This necessitates the development of routines and
results in the institutionalization of processes. Institutionalization of processes can, however, lead to inertia, the inability to change as the environment demands. For new organizational forms to emerge, substantial stress needs to be
created by a change in the resource space (or niche) that
causes a particular organizational form to lose legitimacy on
account of diminished reliability and accountability.
In recent years, conglomerate diversified firms have experienced a loss of legitimacy as a superior organizational form
from the shareholders’ point of view, because their reliability
and accountability have become suspect. With few exceptions, conglomerate diversified firms have failed to provide
reliable returns to shareholders compared with what shareholders could earn from investing in other organizational
forms. Furthermore, the management of conglomerates may
have failed to provide rational explanations for the advantage
of the unrelated, diversified nature of its business portfolio.
The gap between the desired and provided reliability and
accountability could have prompted investors to move their
capital to organizational forms perceived to be more reliable
and accountable, such as related, diversified firms. Indeed,
this is reflected in the phenomenon commonly referred to as
“conglomerate discount” (i.e., the stock market imposes a discount on the share prices of conglomerate diversified firms;
Heuskel 1996). The stress from this change in the niche may
lead firms to adapt through deconglomeration. Therefore,
P3: The lower the perceived legitimacy of the conglomerate
diversified firm as an organizational form, the greater is the
deconglomeration intensity.

Corporate Governance Drivers
The separation of ownership and management of firms, coupled with wide diffusion of ownership among a large number of shareholders, often diminishes the power of shareholders (principals) and provides managers (agents)
considerable discretion over policy decisions. Agency theory explores these issues by analyzing situations that lead to
such problems and drawing up contracts to mitigate them
(for a review, see Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992; Jensen
and Meckling 1976). Agency theory explains conglomeration as a consequence of differences in the risk preferences
between managers and shareholders and an inability to control the consequent self-serving managerial behavior:

∑Managers may be inclined to reduce their employment risk by
diversifying because higher levels of unrelated diversification
are likely to reduce variance in cash flows and the risk of
bankruptcy (Amihud and Lev 1981). However, excessive
unrelated diversification may hurt the performance of the firm,
because managers may not be able to control all the subsidiaries of the diversified firm appropriately and may not
focus enough on innovation (Hoskisson and Hitt 1990). This
creates a conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders.
∑Shareholders are constrained in their ability to control opportunistic behavior by managers because of the difficulty and/or
expense of acquiring information. The board of directors,
which usually has enough information on managerial behavior, is expected to control opportunistic behavior by managers
(Fama and Jensen 1983). However, more often than not, management controls the selection of board members and the functioning of the board. Consequently, the power of the board to
control opportunistic managerial behavior may be limited.
∑It is possible to control managerial behavior through appropriate compensation schemes. Traditionally, however, the
bulk of top management’s compensation was tied to the size
of the firm. Managerial self-interest, under the influence of
such compensation plans, may have led to diversification
through acquisition in order to increase the asset and revenue
base of the company (see Fama and Jensen 1983).

During the 1980s, three mechanisms emerged to control
or discipline managers who may be inclined to pursue corporate strategies that might be undesirable from the perspective
of shareholders—the market for corporate control, managerial compensation linked to stock performance, and institutional activism in corporate governance. We discuss the
impact of these three mechanisms on deconglomeration next.
The market for corporate control. The market for
corporate control has emerged to discipline ineffective
managers through takeover of firms (Fama and Jensen 1983).
Conglomerates performing poorly are particularly strong
candidates for external takeover. There are two ways in which
the market for corporate control can lead to deconglomeration.
First, after a takeover, the new owners often replace the
managers. Therefore, high levels of unrelated diversification,
originally sought by managers to reduce their employment
risk, may increase employment risk in an active market for
corporate control. Consequently, managers may pay heed
to the threat of hostile takeovers and run the firm more
efficiently (Walsh and Seward 1990). This may lead to a
reduction in inefficient forms of diversification (from the
shareholders’ perspective) and consequently deconglomeration. Second, extremely high levels of debt are often used
to finance takeovers. Such high levels of debt force new
owners/managers to divest businesses selectively from the
firm’s portfolio to reduce the debt. The most logical candidates
for divestiture are strategic business units (SBUs) with the
least potential to leverage the firm’s core competencies.
The extent to which the market for corporate control is
likely to affect deconglomeration intensity will depend on
how well developed the market for corporate control is in
the country in which a firm is headquartered and its securities are primarily traded. Consider, for example, the differences in the stage of development of the market for corporate control alluded to in a Boston Consulting Group (Lewis
and Peck 1991) study:

Financial markets and corporate ownership patterns have
differed between the U.S./U.K. and German systems…:
weaker companies are not as heavily discounted in the
(German) stock market as in the U.S. As a result, Germany
hasn’t had a well-developed market for corporate control.… Takeovers, radical restructurings, and sales of lowperforming businesses—all familiar in the U.S. and the
U.K.—are rare in Germany and on most of the continent.

Therefore,
P4: The more developed the market for corporate control, the
greater is the deconglomeration intensity.

Managerial compensation. As noted previously, the bulk
of top management’s compensation traditionally has been
tied to the size of the firm. This may have led to diversification through acquisitions intended to increase the asset and
revenue base of the company (Fama and Jensen 1983). More
recently, however, there has been a shift toward compensating top managers through stock options. When a large proportion of top managers’ compensation is in the form of
stock options, it ties their income closely to stock performance. This motivates managers to initiate actions conducive to increasing the market value of the firm. Therefore,
the top management of a firm may divest businesses that
adversely affect the firm’s share price and, in turn, its own
compensation (Hoskisson and Hitt 1994). Therefore,
P5: The larger the proportion of top managers’ total compensation that is in the form of stock options, the greater is the
deconglomeration intensity.

Institutional activism in corporate governance. During
the past few decades, the structure of ownership of U.S. corporations has changed drastically. Institutional investors
such as mutual funds and pension funds have emerged as
major shareholders that own more than half the equity of
public companies. Since the mid-1980s, institutional
investors have become increasingly assertive in their quest
to improve control mechanisms and curb managers’ pursuit
of self-serving strategies, such as high levels of unrelated
diversification, that are likely to have an adverse impact on
the market value of the firm (David 1996). This, in turn,
may have led to deconglomeration. Therefore,
P6: The greater the level of institutional activism in the governance of conglomerate firms, the greater is the deconglomeration intensity.

Behavior of Referent Firms
Institutional theory suggests that competitive behavior of
firms is based on a collective cognitive framework that
exists within firms (Porac and Rosa 1996). Firms compare
their activities with those of their rivals and peers to enhance
their understanding of strategies. When a firm takes an
action, such as deconglomeration, other firms analyze the
action and decide on its appropriateness. If the action were
to be taken by firms that are leaders, it gets deeply embedded in the managerial cognitive construction of the competitive space and gains legitimacy. Legitimacy makes a strategic action less risky, from a political perspective, because it
may be easier to justify the failure of actions that have a high
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degree of legitimacy. This furthers the tendency of other
firms to copy the action (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
To the extent that deconglomeration is perceived as conducive to superior firm performance or is undertaken by
leading firms, other firms may copy this action (i.e., engage
in mimetic action). Deconglomeration as a strategy has
received a fair degree of acclaim from the popular press and
investor support on Wall Street. This confers further legitimacy on deconglomeration as an effective strategy. Therefore, managers of conglomerate firms may, by mimetic
action, engage in similar divestiture behavior. Thus, the
enshrining of deconglomeration as a successful strategy in
managerial cognitive constructions may be a reason for the
divestiture behavior of conglomerate firms. Therefore,
P7: The greater the deconglomeration intensity of referent
firms, the greater is the deconglomeration intensity of the
focal firm.

Market Power
Market power is the ability of a market participant or group
of participants to influence price, quality, and the nature of
the product in the marketplace (Shepherd 1970). In the past,
generalized market power, determined by the overall size of
the firm, was considered critical to overall firm performance. This belief could have acted as a driver of conglomeration, because firms may have accumulated businesses
with the objective of increasing firm size. However,
research evidence shows that, more than generalized market
power, it is industry-specific market power that influences
overall firm performance (Montgomery 1985). Furthermore,
Montgomery finds that, on average, highly diversified firms
do not have strong market positions in the product-markets
in which they compete.4 Business divestitures by conglomerates can therefore be explained as a strategic behavior
intended to free up resources in order to enhance the industry-specific market power of businesses in their portfolio.
Therefore,
P8: The lower the industry-specific market power of businesses in a conglomerate’s portfolio, the greater is the
deconglomeration intensity.

Strategic Variety
Strategic variety refers to differences in the strategic characteristics of the businesses in a firm’s portfolio. It is a function of the unrelatedness of the businesses in the firm’s portfolio and the diversity of the markets in which they operate.
Excessive strategic variety of the businesses in a conglomerate’s portfolio may motivate deconglomeration.

4Although

empirical evidence suggests that, on average, highly
diversified firms do not have strong market positions in the product-markets in which they compete, there are nevertheless exceptions. For example, over the years, General Electric has divested
several businesses that had poor prospects for achieving the company’s stated market share goal of being “number one or number
two” in the respective industries and has redeployed the freed up
assets in businesses that show greater promise of becoming dominant businesses within their respective industries.
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The resource-based theory of the firm suggests that
the sustainability of the competitive advantage of the various businesses in a firm’s portfolio is a function of the
core competencies of the firm (Barney 1991; Hunt and
Morgan 1995; Prahalad and Hamel 1990). A firm’s core
competencies are based on the collective learning in the
organization and built around resources that are valuable,
rare, difficult to imitate, and not easily substitutable (Barney 1991). As noted by Prahalad and Hamel (1990, p. 81):
“The real sources of advantage are to be found in management’s ability to consolidate corporate wide technologies and production skills into competencies that
empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities.”
A firm’s ability to consolidate and leverage competencies has implications for deconglomeration. Although a
firm’s core competencies can be leveraged for entry into
related businesses, it may not be possible to leverage these
resources for success in vastly unrelated businesses. Moreover, it may be difficult to generate and nurture firm-specific
resources required for success in vastly different businesses.
This follows from the likelihood that firm-specific resources
are often socially complex (spread over many people or
groups), causally ambiguous, and deeply embedded in organizational routines and processes (Barney 1991). The cognitive limitations of a firm’s management may often act as a
constraint on its attempts to learn, sustain, and leverage multiple firm-specific resources necessary for success in businesses with substantial strategic variety.
Coping with strategic variety becomes an even greater
cognitive burden on management when the risks and complexities of multiple international markets are added.
Addressing this burden, Prahalad and Bettis (1986, p. 494)
state, “Divesting businesses to get more focus to the portfolio results from an implicit recognition that the demands on
top management of strategic variety can be significant.”
Therefore, one of the reasons underlying deconglomeration
may be the limitation of management’s cognitive capability
to handle the strategic variety and complexity that operating
in many international markets with a diversified portfolio of
unrelated businesses entails. Therefore,
P9: The greater the strategic variety of a conglomerate firm’s
business portfolio, the greater is the deconglomeration
intensity.

Outcomes for Marketing
Deconglomeration influences a firm’s strategic imperatives,
resource position, control systems, and market environment
as follows:
1. Although the conglomerate firm relies on financial
synergy–driven unrelated diversification as a basis for
growth, after deconglomeration, in light of the fewer related
businesses in its portfolio, the firm’s growth depends on
developing retained businesses through the pursuit of
appropriate strategies.
2. Deconglomeration frees up resources—financial resources
as well as top management’s time—that previously were
spent coordinating and controlling SBUs with very different
knowledge bases.

3. The strategic variety of the conglomerate firm often limits
senior management’s ability to control subsidiary operation
through financial controls. After deconglomeration, the
greater strategic focus of the firm enables senior management to employ strategic controls to guide managerial
behavior.
4. Deconglomeration is likely to lead to more concentrated
market structures in the markets in which the firm continues
to operate. Furthermore, deconglomeration may also
increase the relative market overlap of a firm with its rivals.

These changes can conceivably influence the firm’s marketing strategy and processes. In the sections that follow, we
examine in detail how one or more of these changes associated with deconglomeration influence aspects of firm
behavior that are particularly relevant to marketing strategy
researchers and marketing managers.
Effect on Competitive Behavior
In this section, we focus on the likely effect of deconglomeration on three organizational and market characteristics
that have been extensively explored in marketing and strategy literature as factors that shape the competitive behavior
of firms: competitor orientation, multimarket contact, and
seller concentration.
Competitor orientation. Competitor orientation refers to
the extent to which firms focus on learning about the actions
of their rivals and reflects their propensity to respond to
competitors (Narver and Slater 1990). The effectiveness of
a firm’s responses to the actions initiated by rivals critically
influences its competitive advantage (Dickson 1992).
Therefore, focusing on and responding to the actions
initiated by competitors are critical for the long-term vitality
of the firm.
The leaner business portfolio of a firm after deconglomeration is likely to provide top management with greater
opportunities to focus on the market behavior of competitors.
In effect, the greater availability of top management’s time as
a resource is likely to enhance the ability of the firm to focus
on the market behavior of competing firms. Before deconglomeration, top management’s attention would more likely
have been focused on monitoring and coordinating the operations of different business units characterized by a high degree
of strategic variety. Greater attention from top management to
competitive activities can be expected to lead to greater competitor orientation for firms (Kohli and Jaworski 1990). Furthermore, the overall growth of a firm after deconglomeration
is dependent on fewer businesses. Given the heightened
importance of the growth of the retained businesses to the
overall growth of the firm, the motivation of firms to monitor
rivals is likely to be greater. Some of the resources made
available by divestitures are likely to be deployed toward
scanning the market and gleaning insights into competitors’
behavior. This would help raise awareness of competitors’
actions. In summary, after deconglomeration, the competitor
orientation of the businesses retained by the firm is likely to
increase because of (1) greater top management attention and
(2) redeployment of resources toward market scanning.
P10: The greater the deconglomeration intensity, the greater is the
competitor orientation of the businesses retained by the firm.

Market overlap. Multimarket contact, a measure of market overlap, is defined as the number of markets in which
the focal firm competes with its rivals as a percentage of its
total number of markets. Research in the area of multimarket competition suggests that when the same firms compete
against each other in many markets, the intensity of rivalry
between them may decrease (Gimeno and Woo 1996; Jayachandran, Gimeno, and Varadarajan 1999). Meeting in
multiple markets may increase firms’ ability to deter one
another from aggressive actions, because an action initiated
by a firm in one market may provoke retaliatory actions by
rivals in many markets. Therefore, a higher proportion of
revenues would be at risk in the event of competitive retaliation under the multimarket context compared with the single-market context. The possibility that more revenue will
be at risk may act as a constraining force and prevent firms
from engaging rivals in intense competition (Edwards
1955).
The expectation that after deconglomeration the relative
market overlap of a firm with competitors will increase is
based on the premise that it is unlikely that any two firms in
an industry would pursue similar patterns of product-market
diversification over a period of time. In other words, it is
unlikely that conglomerate firms would have business portfolios with many competing businesses.5 Therefore, the
market overlap between conglomerate diversified firms, as a
percentage of their total markets, may not be high. After
deconglomeration, however, firms will see an increase in the
percentage of market overlap with rivals. This overlap may
increase further when firms redeploy resources freed up by
divestitures into market expansion in the retained businesses
in domestic and international markets.
P11: The greater the deconglomeration intensity, the greater is
the multimarket contact of the firm with competing
firms.

Seller concentration. Seller concentration refers to the
oligopolistic nature of a market and is an important predictor of competitive behavior. Increased seller concentration,
according to the SCP perspective, is likely to provide firms
with greater opportunities for tacit collusion, resulting in
reduced emphasis on price competition and higher prices.
Research evidence shows that businesses divested by conglomerates tend to be acquired by firms in closely related
businesses or firms in the same industry. For example, studies show that
∑In divestitures that followed acquisition, more than 70% of
the assets acquired in hostile takeovers ended up being
managed by firms in the same line of business as those
assets.

5Consider, for example, the patterns of product-market diversification pursued during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s by Coca-Cola
Inc. (Columbia Pictures entertainment, Maryland Club brand beverages, California Taylor brand wine beverages, Minute Maid
brand fruit-based beverages, plastic cutlery business, pasta business, and desalination equipment business) and PepsiCo (Wilson
Sporting Goods; North Atlantic Van Lines; Frito-Lay snack foods;
and Pizza Hut, KFC, and Taco Bell chains of fast-food restaurants).
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∑Within three years following leveraged buyouts, approximately 50% of the assets were sold to buyers in the same
industry (see Schleifer and Vishny 1991).

Furthermore, as noted previously, after deconglomeration, a firm can be expected to redeploy some of the freed up
resources toward acquisition of direct and/or peripheral competitors in the businesses in which the firm chooses to remain.
Consequently, deconglomeration can be expected to lead to
changes in the market structure of the industries from which
a conglomerate exits, as well as the ones in which it chooses
to remain. The net effect is that the industries from which a
conglomerate exits and the ones in which it chooses to remain
are likely to become more concentrated than before.
P12: The greater the deconglomeration intensity, the greater is
the seller concentration in the industries served by the
businesses retained.

In summary, as a result of the influence of deconglomeration on competitor orientation, multimarket contact, and
seller concentration, after deconglomeration, the competitive
behavior of firms is likely to change. The specific nature of
the change would depend on the relative influence of deconglomeration on each of these factors and is an empirical issue.
Effect on Customer Orientation
After deconglomeration, the relationship of a firm with customers will be centered on fewer businesses. Moreover, as a
result of redeployment of resources freed up by divestitures
to enhance the competitive position of the businesses that
are retained, it can be expected that the retained businesses
are likely to serve a much larger and more global customer
base. The future growth of the firm after deconglomeration
depends on the customer base of the retained businesses
(rather than on customers inherited through acquisition of
unrelated businesses in conglomerates). Consequently,
firms are more likely to adopt a long-term orientation in
their relationships with their customers after deconglomeration. This is likely to enhance the firm’s commitment to satisfying customers’ needs. Customer orientation involves
keeping track of customers’ needs and disseminating this
information within the organization (Narver and Slater
1990). Greater customer orientation enables a firm to perceive customer dissatisfaction, should such a situation exist,
and respond to the causes of customer dissatisfaction. Consequently, greater customer orientation can be expected to
support the firm’s efforts to retain customers as well as
attract new customers in the markets served by its businesses. In effect, when the firm’s relationship is centered on
fewer businesses, the increased importance of both customer retention and attracting new customers for growth
makes it imperative that firms become more customer oriented after deconglomeration.
Furthermore, it becomes possible for the firm to upgrade
its customer support activities and become more customer
oriented because of the resources made available by deconglomeration. The ability of the firm to scan markets, understand customers’ needs better, and satisfy these needs can
improve as a result of redeployment of resources to nurture
businesses retained in the firm’s portfolio. In summary,
compared with its predecessor, the firm that emerges in the
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aftermath of deconglomeration is likely to (1) devote greater
attention to acquiring information about customers’ needs
and responding to their needs and (2) deploy more resources
toward these activities, making the businesses retained by
the firm more customer oriented.
P13: The greater the deconglomeration intensity, the greater is
the level of customer orientation of the businesses
retained by the firm.

Effect on New Product Introduction
New product development through innovations is critical to
the long-term viability of firms. Some innovations may be
informal as a result of digression from routine activities in
firms and design improvements through “learning by doing,”
but to an increasing degree, innovation is the result of formal
research and development (R&D) (Scherer and Ross 1990).
Informal innovative activities can be encouraged by building
capabilities to learn by doing, and formal innovative activity
through R&D can be encouraged by instituting the right
incentive systems to motivate managers to take risks. Deconglomeration can be expected to enable firms to improve their
innovative ability by enhancing their capacity to learn by
doing and by allowing them to use incentive systems more
attuned to the promotion of risk taking by managers
(Hoskisson and Hitt 1994). Furthermore, as explained next,
firms are likely to pursue innovation with greater zeal after
deconglomeration because of its heightened importance.
As Dosi (1988) notes, the heuristics of how to do things
and how to improve them are often captured and embodied
in organizational routines. Much of this knowledge, therefore, has the characteristic of tacitness. Through practice,
repetition, and incremental improvements of such routines,
firms develop the ability to explore opportunities in certain
areas and create specific marketable products. By their very
nature, such tacit skills are also likely to be of use only
within a narrow domain of products or services in which
they tend to be valuable. A conglomerate firm would need to
nurture many different skills in its different businesses,
whereas a related diversified firm may need to develop and
sustain fewer skills that will be used in all its businesses.
Therefore, it may become difficult for a conglomerate,
compared with a related diversified firm that uses the same
skills in many businesses, to continuously develop and
enhance the many different tacit skills required for success
in many different businesses because of the more limited use
of such skills. This follows from the observation that tacit
skills are refined and improved through repetition. In other
words, the focus on core competencies associated with
deconglomeration should enhance the ability of firms to sustain and develop tacit knowledge further. Therefore, deconglomeration and organizing a firm around its core competencies may improve its ability to undertake informal
innovative activity.
Innovative activities through R&D in firms often
involve substantial degrees of risk because the technical and
commercial outcomes of research activities cannot be determined accurately ex ante. Most R&D projects are of a longterm nature and thereby are inimical to short-term profitability. In a conglomerate firm, strategic control (i.e., the

control of different businesses in the portfolio by evaluation
of the strategies employed by them to compete) is difficult.
The sheer strategic variety of the businesses in the corporate
portfolio and the large spans of control will limit the ability
of top management to exercise strategic control. This, in
turn, may lead to a “by the numbers” orientation in which
financial data are exclusively emphasized for control purposes (Hoskisson and Hitt 1988) and top management uses
financial rather than strategic criteria to evaluate the performance of SBU managers. Typically, financial criteria such
as return on assets and return on sales are short-term
focused, whereas strategic criteria, designed to evaluate the
quality of strategies, can be long-term oriented. Exclusive
reliance on short-term–oriented financial criteria by conglomerates could lead to a reduction in formal R&D activity
in firms. The use of strategic controls in conjunction with
financial controls to influence managerial behavior, a
greater possibility after deconglomeration, may alleviate
this problem (Hoskisson and Hitt 1994). Furthermore, some
of the resources freed up by deconglomeration could be
used for expansion of R&D programs.
Reduction in a firm’s debt after deconglomeration can
also be expected to cause an upswing in R&D investment in
firms (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland 1990; Hoskisson and
Hitt 1994). Conglomerate firms often use debt as a mode of
financing diversification. A firm’s debt holders are typically
risk averse and may not encourage long-term–oriented R&D
activity. Therefore, deconglomeration is likely to enhance
the innovative capability of firms. In summary, both informal and formal innovation is likely to experience an
upswing in the aftermath of deconglomeration. Consequently, new product intensity (i.e., the percentage of revenues derived from new products) may increase in the businesses retained by the firm after deconglomeration.
P14: The greater the deconglomeration intensity, the greater is
the new product intensity in the businesses retained by the
firm.

Effect on Brand Advertising
The greater ability of the firm to use strategic controls after
deconglomeration can also be expected to influence the relative emphasis of its businesses on brand advertising and
sales promotion in the marketplace. Brand equity, a marketbased asset of immense value to the firm, is a function of
customers’ awareness and favorable attitudes toward a
brand. A firm that develops brands of superior equity can
leverage the equity to improve its cash flows and thereby
generate shareholder value. Apart from superior product
attributes, brand equity may be created by the use of extensive advertising promoting a brand’s image (Srivastava,
Sherwani, and Fahey 1998). Developing brand equity
through image advertising is essentially a long-term activity
necessitating considerable advertising expenditures.
Since the 1970s and continuing into the late 1980s,
advertising expenditure as a percentage of total marketing
communications expenditures has shrunk considerably,
whereas expenditure on sales promotion has seen a corresponding increase. Although many reasons can be given for
the relative decline in the use of advertising and the increas-

ing use of sales promotion, one critical reason has been the
short-term orientation of firms and the corresponding pressure on managers to produce immediate sales results (Blattberg and Neslin 1989). Sales promotion essentially
involves the use of incentives (1) to induce the trade and
consumers to buy a brand and (2) to motivate and encourage
the sales force to sell it. The incentive, which could take different forms, changes the value proposition of the brand
temporarily. Sales promotion programs typically are used to
boost the sales of the brand temporarily by employing a
stronger short-term push strategy. However, this tactic may
have serious long-term drawbacks. First, the increase in promotion expenditures often comes at the expense of advertising to build the brand’s equity. Second, by frequently
employing promotions, manufacturers condition customers
to become deal prone—to buy only when the brand is on
promotion. In other words, frequent promotions change the
value proposition of the brand in the consumers’ perception
in the direction of the temporary value proposition created
by the promotion. Therefore, frequent promotions could
dilute the equity of the brand (Shimp 1999).
As noted, frequent promotions are often a result of shortterm–oriented policies. Such policies, as observed previously, are more likely in conglomerate firms because of the
greater tendency in such firms to use financial controls
exclusively. After deconglomeration, a firm is more likely to
use strategic controls in conjunction with financial controls.
Furthermore, in the more focused firms that emerge from
deconglomeration, the role of top management is more
likely to be that of custodian of the firm’s resources such as
brand equity than that of an arbiter of financial capital.
These changes are likely to encourage long-term efforts at
building the equity of the brand through advertising and
other activities. Thus, deconglomeration is likely to result in
an increase in advertising expenditure and a corresponding
decrease in sales promotion activities.
P15: The greater the deconglomeration intensity, the greater is
the advertising intensity (ratio of advertising expenditures
to total promotion expenditures) of the businesses retained
by the firm.

Effect on Corporate Culture
Corporate culture has been defined as a set of values shared
by the members of an organization (Deshpandé and Webster
1989). Primarily, corporate culture guides managers into
acceptable behaviors implicitly and thus reduces the need
for formal monitoring (Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster
1993). Organizations benefit from developing a strong culture that is consistent with achieving their desired objectives.
Two dimensions characterize corporate or organizational
culture. The first dimension ranges from organic to mechanistic processes. Organic processes refer to a firm’s focus on
flexibility, spontaneity, and individuality, whereas mechanistic processes refer to an organization’s focus on control,
stability, and order. The second dimension represents at its
two extremes the extent to which a firm focuses on internal
maintenance and external positioning. Internal maintenance
refers to the emphasis on the extent to which activities are
smoothed and integrated within the organization to enhance
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efficiency. External positioning is the emphasis of the organization on competition and achieving differentiation in the
marketplace (Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993).
In reference to these dimensions, Deshpandé, Farley,
and Webster (1993) distinguish between four modal cultures—market, clan, hierarchical, and adhocracy. A market
culture emphasizes competitive advantage and market superiority. Loyalty, tradition, and internal maintenance are
viewed as critical in the clan culture. The hierarchical culture emphasizes predictability and smooth operations. Innovativeness, entrepreneurship, and risk taking are viewed as
critical for success in adhocracy cultures. It should be noted,
however, that though these cultures are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, over time one type of culture might
emerge dominant in a firm.
A conglomerate firm must integrate and run many unrelated businesses, none of which is likely to receive a high
degree of attention from top management. These organizations may emphasize internal maintenance and predictability
because of the need to run unrelated businesses smoothly. It
is more likely that under such conditions firms may emphasize loyalty and tradition or have norms that encourage a
high degree of predictability. This follows from the possibility that managerial information processing abilities are
likely to be restricted in a conglomerate firm. This, in turn,
would necessitate an emphasis on cultures that encourage
loyalty and predictability, in which lower-level managers
can be expected to behave in ways considered desirable by
senior management without a high degree of monitoring. In
other words, a conglomerate is more likely to focus on efficiency and encourage clan or hierarchical cultures.
In contrast, the relatively more focused firms that
emerge in the aftermath of deconglomeration are likely to
encourage cultures that emphasize concentrating on competition and building competitive advantage. Furthermore,
they may also focus on risk-taking cultures that emphasize
innovation. This follows from the need of focused firms to
grow through competitive activities that snare market share
from competitors or through innovative activities that help
market development. These firms are less likely to emphasize cultures that attempt to make the organization predictable and efficient in place of ones that emphasize
aggressive market actions and innovations. In summary,
after deconglomeration, firms are more likely to develop a
corporate culture of the market or adhocracy types than the
clan or hierarchical types.
P16: The greater the deconglomeration intensity, the greater is
the likelihood of the firm developing an adhocracy or
market culture as opposed to a clan or hierarchical culture.

Effect on Locus of Decision Making for Marketing
Strategy
Issues related to marketing’s influence within the firm, relative to other functional areas, have received considerable
attention in marketing literature (Homburg, Workman, and
Krohmer 1999; Walker and Ruekert 1987). A related issue is
top management’s influence in marketing strategy decisions
and marketing’s influence in corporate strategy decisions.
As noted previously, strategy can be broadly construed as
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existing at the corporate, business, and functional levels in a
firm. Correspondingly, strategic decision-making authority
also tends to be distributed among these different levels in
the firm. In other words, it is possible to distinguish between
the locus of strategy (marketing, business, and corporate
strategy) and the locus of decision making (marketing, business, and corporate management levels) (Varadarajan and
Clark 1994). Deconglomeration can be expected to result in
an upward shift in the locus of decision making for some of
the marketing strategy decisions from the marketing function to the business and/or corporate levels.
Research shows that the more diversified the firm, the
more time is spent on corporate-level planning rather than
business-level planning (Leontiades and Tezel 1981). After
deconglomeration, when the firm’s portfolio is composed of
fewer businesses, the demands placed on top management’s
time toward addressing portfolio management issues such as
business addition and deletion and resource allocation are
likely to diminish. Deconglomeration can therefore be
expected to lead to cuts in staff and reductions in bureaucracy, which in turn places corporate executives in closer
contact with business units (Hoskisson and Hitt 1994;
Hoskisson and Turk 1990). Furthermore, the future growth
of the firm becomes more dependent on the growth of businesses retained through marketing-oriented activities such
as building brand equity and improving customer satisfaction. This heightens the likelihood of top management
becoming more involved in marketing and business strategy
decisions as well as boundary-spanning activities (e.g.,
greater and more frequent interface with customers, channel
members, and the marketplace at large). Therefore,
P17: The greater the deconglomeration intensity, the greater is
the extent of top management’s involvement in marketing
strategy decision making.

Future Research Directions
This article has the potential to spur research pertaining to
the proposed conceptual model as well as in other related
areas. We first discuss issues related to the empirical testing
of the conceptual model and elaborate on construct operationalization. After this, we discuss other potential issues for
research in related areas.
Issues in Model Testing
The proposed model lends itself to testing in its entirety as
well as in a modular manner (i.e., sections of the model delineating the linkages of [1] drivers to deconglomeration intensity and [2] deconglomeration intensity to outcomes). A brief
explication of the rationale underlying the latter approach is
perhaps required. Over a period spanning almost two decades,
conglomerate firms have, to varying degrees, restructured
their business portfolios through divestitures. Looking backward, it is important to gain insights into the extent to which
the antecedent factors delineated in the model explain the
portfolio-restructuring behavior of conglomerates. In this
regard, an empirical study testing the relationships between
deconglomeration intensity and its antecedents could provide
valuable insights. Alternatively, because many firms (particu-

larly in the United States) have already undergone deconglomeration, looking forward, it is critical to focus on the relationship between deconglomeration intensity and its hypothesized outcomes. In other words, depending on the perspective,
the model could be tested in full or in two modules.
Alternative conceptualizations of the focal construct. In
the proposed model, the focal construct is conceptualized as
deconglomeration intensity. The model, however, is
amenable to alternative conceptualizations of this construct.
For example, the focal construct may be conceptualized as a
nominal variable (the predeconglomeration and
postdeconglomeration firm), where deconglomeration is
perceived as a discrete event. In this case, testing the model
would involve examinations of (1) how the antecedent
conditions lead to a change in the status of the firm and (2)
how this change in status influences the subsequent
marketing behavior of the businesses in the firm’s portfolio.
Alternative empirical settings. The model can be tested
in an array of empirical settings, such as (1) a multicountry,
longitudinal study; (2) a single-country, longitudinal study;
(3) a multicountry, cross-sectional study; and (4) a singlecountry, cross-sectional study of a sample of firms. Testing
the model longitudinally would entail examining the relationship between deconglomeration intensity and the extent
of change in the antecedent variables (e.g., the degree and
direction of change in the intensity of antitrust policy deterrents to intraindustry mergers) over a defined multiyear time
frame. This can be studied in a single-country or multicountry setting. A cross-sectional study in a single-country setting, though feasible, would be somewhat limiting, because
for some of the antecedent constructs, variance can be
expected only in a multicountry setting.
Furthermore, only a longitudinal research design would
allow for the inclusion and assessment of the relative effect
of the construct “openness of international markets.” Intrinsically, this is a global-level construct that varies over time.
The world at large is more open to international trade and
foreign direct investments now than before and is likely to
be even more open in the future. In other words, a crosssectional design would involve testing a reduced model of
the antecedents to deconglomeration. However, the full
model can be tested for the consequences section. Both the
full model and the submodels, however, are amenable to
testing as specified in a cross-sectional setting by means of
perceptual measures in place of objective measures (e.g.,
management’s perceptions of the openness of international
markets, intensity of antitrust policy deterrents to intraindustry mergers, as predictors of deconglomeration intensity). In summary, we wish to emphasize that the proposed
model can be tested with a variety of approaches.
Data sources and construct operationalization. Testing of
the full model or the submodels can be accomplished through
secondary data (e.g., objective archival measures of the
openness of international markets), primary data (e.g.,
managers’ perceptions of advertising intensity before and after
deconglomeration), or some combination of both. In Table 1,
we summarize some potential measures of the constructs that
can be developed mostly from archival data sources. The

proposed approaches to construct operationalization in Table
1 are intended to be suggestive and are therefore in need of
further refinement. A detailed discussion of measurementrelated issues is beyond the scope of this article.
Other Related Research Issues
The case of premium conglomerates. Although deconglomeration has indeed been a major force in reshaping the
contemporary corporate landscape and has been motivated
by a variety of drivers delineated in Figure 1, a small minority of firms continues to operate successfully as conglomerate, diversified firms. A Boston Consulting Group study
(Heuskel 1996) reports that the distinguishing characteristics of “premium conglomerates” are their executives’ skills
in managing complexity. According to the study, premium
conglomerates excel in three managerial tasks:
∑Making acquisitions only when the competitive logic is compelling and not hesitating to divest businesses that are competitively at a disadvantage or are a poor fit,
∑Managing portfolios of businesses as well as people and ideas
(e.g., initiatives to replicate best practices across the company), and
∑Mobilizing and deploying capabilities to breach competitive
barriers and enter new businesses (i.e., making complexity
their ally).

A closer examination of these three areas of excellence
for premium conglomerates reveals their ability to overcome the weaknesses that beset the typical conglomerate.
The existence of such firms neither negates the occurrence
of deconglomeration nor invalidates the more general drivers and implications of deconglomeration. Rather, these
exceptions provide an opportunity for further research. A
detailed discussion of endogenous (e.g., leadership style,
organizational structure, systems) and exogenous (e.g.,
structural characteristics of the industries) factors underlying the superior performance of premium conglomerates is
beyond the scope of this article. However, we recognize its
importance in the broader context of enhancing the understanding of the linkages among environment, strategy, competitive advantage, and firm performance.
Research on product elimination. The literature in
marketing devoted to the study of product deletion decisions
(Boulding, Morgan, and Staelin 1997; Montgomery and Urban
1969) has a long history. Many of the theories we used in this
article to explain business deletion decisions can be leveraged
to enhance the understanding of deletion decisions at the
product and brand levels. In other words, although we focus on
explaining business deletion decisions of firms, the theories
explicated in this article could aid marketing managers and
marketing researchers in understanding better the forces that
shape a business’s portfolio of products and brands.
Resource redeployment and brand rationalization. As
noted previously, deconglomeration is associated with redeployment of resources from businesses divested to businesses
retained by the firm. The pattern and mode of such redeployment is an important issue for further research. Although we
indicate the broad redirections of such redeployment, an
investigation of the specific directions of this redeployment
could help illuminate the process behind the change in firm
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TABLE 1
Drivers and Outcomes of Deconglomeration: Construct Operationalization Issuesa
Construct

Operationalization

P1: International market openness

Foreign direct investment over a specific period

P2a: Intensity of antitrust policy
deterrents to intraindustry
mergers and acquisitions

Number of horizontal mergers and acquisitions over a specific period

P2b: Intensity of antitrust policy
deterrents to diversification into
related businesses

Number of mergers and acquisitions among related businesses over a specific
period

P3: Legitimacy of organizational form

Share price penalty for conglomerate diversification

P4: State of development of the
market for corporate control

Number of takeovers during a specific period

P5: Composition of top management
compensation

Ratio of the value of long-term options (stock option grants, share grants, and
performance incentives) to total compensation

P6: Level of institutional activism

A count measure of the number of instances of announced activism over a certain
period (David 1996)

P7: Behavior of referent firms

Number of conglomerate firms engaging in deconglomeration over a specific period

P8: Industry-specific market power

Market share of Business X in the firm’s portfolio

P9: Strategic variety

A measure combining the relatedness of businesses in a firm’s portfolio and the
number of markets in which it operates

P10: Competitor orientation

Extent to which firms focus on learning about the actions of their rivals (Narver and
Slater 1990)

P11: Multimarket contact

Count number of market contacts as a percentage of total number of markets
(Gimeno and Woo 1996)

P12: Seller concentration

Combined market share of the four largest businesses in the industry

P13: Customer orientation

Expenditure on customer support and customer information generation as a
percentage of sales

P14: New product intensity

Number of new products/total sales (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland 1990)

P15: Advertising intensity

Advertising expenditure/total promotion expenditure

P16: Organizational culture

Measure of adhocracy, clan, hierarchy, or market culture (Deshpandé, Farley, and
Webster 1993)

P17: Locus of decision making

Percentage of time allocated to marketing strategy decision making by top
management

aAs

is detailed in the text of the article, several of the constructs listed in the table are amenable to operationalization as perceptual measures;
for example, on a five-point scale, managers’ perceptions of the intensity of antitrust policy deterrents to intraindustry mergers and acquisitions
can be measured “much greater than before,” “greater than before,” “about the same,” “lower than before,” and “much lower than before.”

behavior after deconglomeration. The importance of such
issues is highlighted in a recent study by Capron and Hulland
(1999) that examines the extent to which firms redeploy three
key marketing resources (brand names, sales forces, and general marketing expertise) after horizontal acquisitions.
Resource redeployment is reflected in the brand rationalization activities that firms often undertake after deconglomeration and the subsequent acquisitions of competitors
of the businesses retained in order to pursue focused growth.
In these cases, the firm will likely inherit several brand
names in the product categories in which it already competes. Brand rationalization–related issues could be
expected to assume center stage in those firms, which
through one or more intraindustry acquisitions inherit the
rights to more brand names than they view as optimal.
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Brand-related issues that such firms may be required to
address include (1) deciding which brand names to retain
and phase out, (2) pursuing opportunities for brand consolidation through brand fusion/dual branding (e.g., melding of
currently owned brand names and inherited brand names),
and (3) organizing retained brand names into categories
such as corporate-, business-, and product-level brand
names or global brands, multicountry regional brands, country-specific national brands, and country-specific regional
brands.
Research on other cross-level issues. The primary focus
of this article was a cross-level strategic issue: the
implications for marketing of a corporate-level strategic
decision. At a more fundamental level, it is conceivable that
corporate strategy, in turn, is influenced by functional-level

and business-level strategies. The manner in which key
businesses in a firm’s portfolio choose to compete could
influence the portfolio composition if the strategic
imperatives of different businesses are conflicting.
Furthermore, functional-level strategies (R&D strategy,
financial strategy, marketing strategy, and operations
strategy) could constrain a firm’s portfolio of businesses if
the strategies employed by the functional areas of different
businesses are conflicting.
Yet another cross-level issue that merits the consideration of marketing strategy researchers is the role that top
management’s characteristics play in the market-level
behavior of firms. Strategy researchers have taken the
upper-echelons approach to study how idiosyncratic
processes and biases in top management’s behavior influence the strategies adopted by firms. This approach is
guided by the view that an organization reflects its top executives’ perspectives. Therefore, the characteristics and functioning of top management could be a crucial determinant of
organizational behavior (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996) suggest that there is a need to
examine how top management team characteristics influence microcompetitive behavior, supporting the need for
cross-level research. This is an area in which marketing academicians can play a significant role.

Conclusion
In this article, we examine the dependency of marketing strategy on corporate strategy by developing a model that delineates the drivers and outcomes of deconglomeration. As
detailed in the article, the corporate strategy shift that gave rise
to deconglomeration is likely to have significant implications
for marketing. Specifically, the portfolio of businesses managed by a firm could play a fundamental role in determining
the market-level strategies of the businesses. The strategic role
of marketing in organizations is also likely to be reshaped in
the more focused firms that emerge after deconglomeration.
This article contributes to research in marketing strategy
by highlighting cross-level strategic interdependencies. We
elaborate on the changes in marketing strategy and processes
in the focused firm that emerges after deconglomeration. In the
process, we focus the attention of marketing scholars and managers on a critical phenomenon that has reshaped the world of
business. The theoretical insights that we provide in this regard
can also be leveraged into enhancing the understanding of
product deletion decisions of firms. We provide guidelines for
empirical research by developing research propositions and
discussing measurement issues of critical constructs. More
generally, we hope to spur additional research in the area of
strategic interdependencies in organizations.
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